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POSTSCRIPTS
Obscenity in the Mails
In Roth v. United States1 the Supreme
Court laid down what has become a basic
guide for dealing with problems of obscen-
ity and first amendment freedoms. It de-
fined the general test of obscenity to be
"whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest."'2 The
principle just quoted is very often cited by
courts in dealing with obscenity questions,
yet the particular context in which the
problem arose and which produced this
valuable constitutional guide rarely accom-
panies the rule.
The Roth case involved the mailing of
circulars, advertising and a book, deemed
by Post Office officials to be obscene. Title
18, U.S.C., section 1461 provides that:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent,
filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device
or substance ... is declared to be nonmail-
able matter and shall not le conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by
any letter carrier.
Thus, it was within this frame of reference
that the now famous rule was produced.
Recently, in Ackerman v. United States8
the question arose whether section 1461
applied to private letters, and, if so,
whether the Roth test could be applied to
them or only to commercial exploitation of
psychosexual tensions.
t 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2 Id. at 489.
3 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
The predecessor of section 1461 had
specifically included "letters" within its pro-
hibition,4 but a 1955 amendment, which
produced the present section, substituted
the general language "article, thing, device
or substance." The Court, however, had
little difficulty in construing the intent of
the amendment to be "to enlarge the scope
of the statute to include all matter of ob-
scene nature. . . .5
The more interesting question was
whether the Roth test applied to private
letters - in this case, "an exchange of non-
commercial private letters between a seri-
ous writer and another adult person,
dealing with abnormal sex. . . ."I It should
be noted that the lower court experienced
no difficulty in finding the material ob-
scene under the Roth test and the instant
Court agreed, hence the only issue was
the applicability of the test to private
correspondence.
The defendants were apparently seeking
at least in cases of private letters a nar-
rower test, namely, a test whereby ob-
scenity would be judged by the effect of
the matter on the particular addressees.
Noting that such a test was rejected by the
Roth court,7 the instant Court also rejected'
it in the following language:
To qualify the Roth standard, as defendant
suggests, in cases involving non-commercial
4 25 Stat. 496 (1888).
5 Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d 449, 453
(9th Cir. 1961).
6 ld. at 451.
7 ld. at 453.
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private correspondence, would facilitate one
of the mischievous and reprehensible prac-
tices, which the statute was designed to pre-
vent - the indiscriminate mailing of filthy
and obscene, although purportedly private
letters by crackpots or perverts whose con-
victions would be made to depend, not upon
any general standard of obscenity, but upon
the reactions and views of particular
addressees.8
The Court also pointed out that "well-
intentioned writers of letters which might
be susceptible to misconstruction by their
recipients, would be endangered by prose-
cutions, according to the reaction of the
addressee."
Privileged Communications
In the last issue of The Catholic Lawyer,
Rev. Anthony F. LoGatto argued most
compellingly for an extension of the rule
of privileged communications to the social
worker.' Of interest in this connection is
what appears to be some indication of a
liberalization of the statutory privilege of
a clergyman in New York.'
In Kruglikov v. Kruglikov,3 an order
was made for an examination before trial
of a rabbi as a witness. The parties to a
separation action had conferred with him
in his study with a view to a reconciliation.
The rabbi asserted his statutory privilege
when the defendant's attorney asked the
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
I LoGatto, Privileged Communication and the
Social Worker, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 5 (Winter
1962).
2 N.Y. Civ. PaAc. ACT § 351 states: "A clergy-
man, or other minister of any religion, shall not
be allowed to disclose a confession made to him,
in his professional character, in the course of dis-
cipline, enjoined by the rules or practice of the
religious body to which he belongs."
3 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
following question: "Rabbi, will you now
please tell me the substance of the conver-
sation you had with Mr. and Mrs. Krugli-
kov, giving me the date, what each person
said in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Krug-
likov to the best of your recollection?"'
In a letter to the court the New York
Board of Rabbis stated:
The New York Board of Rabbis deem it
essential for the proper work of the rabbi
in the community, that any confidences re-
posed in him by husband or wife, individu-
ally or jointly, or anyone else who has
come to him for counseling not be divulged,
and we hope that the Court will sustain
this action. Otherwise the confidential role
of the rabbi in counseling would be com-
pletely vitiated, to the detriment of those
who seek his guidance. 5
The defendant's attorney contended
that neither party had sought guidance, nor
was either a member of his congregation.
The consultation had been initiated by a
rabbi from another community at the re-
quest of the plaintiff's father, and a letter
by the rabbi involved in the action to the
defendant had brought about the meeting.
The parties had formerly resided in the
community of the rabbi-witness.
In sustaining the right to invoke the
privilege, the court stated:
[l]t matters not how and by whom the
meeting was initiated. . . .The fact is that
.. .the parties consulted a representative
of their faith in the privacy of his study
.... with a view to reconciliation and re-
storing their marriage. It cannot be sup-
posed that either husband or wife, or both,
would have been willing to disclose their
marital problems to the rabbi if they
thought that what they said would ever be
divulged, even in a judicial proceeding ....
[W]hat was said by the parties here ...
Id. at 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
5 Ibid.
was stamped "with that seal of confidence
which the parties in such a situation would
feel no occasion to exact."6
The court concluded that if Section 351
of the Civil Practice Act is not to be stulti-
fied, "confidential communications to a
clergyman under the circumstances here
involved must be deemed to fall within
the spirit of this statute."'
The Law Against Contraceptives"':
In 1873 the federal Comstock Act1
made it unlawful for anyone to deposit in
the mails any information concerning birth
control or to put into carriage in interstate
commerce any article or thing designed,
adapted or intended to prevent conception.
Since that time many states have passed
laws restricting the use, sale or advertise-
ment of contraceptives. Although often
subjected to constitutional attack, these
laws have generally been sustained as valid
exercises of state police power.
The New Jersey Disorderly Persons Act
is a typical state statute dealing with con-
traceptives. It provides:
Any person who, without just cause, utters
or exposes to the view of another, or pos-
sesses with intent to utter or expose to the
view of another, or to sell the same, any
instrument, medicine or other thing, de-
signed or purporting to be designed for the
-prevention of conception or the procuring
of abortion, or who in any way advertises
6 Id. at 18, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
7 Id. at 18, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
: See generally, Regan, The Connecticut Birth
Control Ban and Public Morals, 7 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 5 (Winter 1961); see 6 CATHOLIC LAW-
YER 317 (Autumn 1960).
1 17 Stat. 598 (1873), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62
(1958).
2 For a recent survey in this connection, see 6
CATHOLIC LAWYER 317, 318-19 nn. 9 & 10 (Au-
tumn 1960).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1962
or aids in advertising the same, or in any
manner, whether by recommendation for
or against its use or otherwise, gives or
causes to be given, or aids in giving any
information how or where any such instru-
ment, medicine or other thing may be had,
seen, bought or sold, is a disorderly per-
son.
Recently, this statute was the subject of a
constitutional attack.4 The plaintiff, Sani-
tary Vendors, Inc., had installed automatic
vending machines in locations about the
state which delivered packages of prophy-
lactics or condoms. At various times, New
Jersey law enforcement authorities had
confiscated plaintiff's machines. In addi-
tion, plaintiff's agents and the owners of
various establishments had been threatened
with arrest if they resisted removal of the
machines. Plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, as well as injunctive relief against
its enforcement.
The attack on the statute focused on
the words "without just cause," the con-
tention being that they rendered the sec-
tion vague and unenforceable. In State v.
Kohn,5 a lower New Jersey court had sus-
tained the statute against a similar objec-
tion, indicating that the words "just cause"
meant proper medical care and the like,
and that a defendant might prove "just
cause" by all the circumstances. On the
other hand, a second court, at the same
level, had concluded that the phrase "with-
out just cause" is vague and indefinite and
incapable of judicial or lay construction.(
• N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 170-76 (1951) (emphasis
added).
4 Sanitary Vendors, Inc. v. Byrne, - N.J. Super.
-, 178 A.2d 259 (1962).
5 42 N.J. Super, 578, 127 A.2d 451 (County Ct.
1956).
c State v. Kinney Bldg. Drug Stores, Inc., 56 N.J.
Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430 (County Ct. 1959).
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It held that the statute "says all things to
all men . . . without granting to the pros-
pective defendant his constitutional right
to be fairly apprised of the elements con-
stituting a quasi-criminal infraction."'
The present court indicated that the
statute as originally enacted lacked the
phrase "without just cause," and that when
these words were included the purpose was
to qualify the prohibitions of the statute.
Thus, there were some instances when
possession or sale of these instruments,
medicines or other objects might well be
justified medically. But the court had
earlier noted:
[T]he factual problem here involved is the
indiscriminate sale of contraceptives to
anyone who puts a coin in the machine,
whether it be a teenager, a procurer or a
married person. The factual problem does
not include any question between husband
and wife; about religious belief; nor planned
parenthood; nor prevention of disease."
Stating that the legislature was not re-
quired to list every situation which it
deemed to be with or without just cause,
and that the statute properly protected
persons who may use the prohibited arti-
cles for medical reasons, the court de-
clared that the statute was constitutional.
It further found that the plaintiff was in
violation of the statute.
Recognizing that there would be close
cases, which would make the statute diffi-
cult to apply, the court quoted 9 with ap-
proval from State v. Monteleone:1
That there may be marginal cases in which
it is difficult to determine the side on which
7 Ibid.
Sanitary Vendors, Inc. v. Byrne, - N.J. Super
-, -, 178 A.2d 259, 263 (1962).
Id. at -, 178 A.2d at 265-66.
'036 N.J. 93, 99, 175 A.2d 207, 210 (1961).
a particular fact situation may fall, fur-
nishes insufficient reason to hold the lan-
guage of a penal statute too vague and un-
certain. . . .If a statute is reasonably ap-
propriate in its overall approach, it should
be upheld notwithstanding that it may be
invalid in its application in special circum-
stances or fringe areas.
The Rights of Prisoners*
"A citizen is still a citizen, though
guilty of crime and visited with punish-
ment." 'A man convicted of a crime and
sentenced to prison retains all rights ex-
cept those taken away expressly or by
necessary ,implication.'2 These basic prin-
ciples, though easily stated, create the
difficult problem of determining just what
rights a prisoner possesses, or has relin-
quished.
A recent decision of the New York
Court of Appeals is a good illustration.'
The petitioner, a prison inmate, instituted
a proceeding in the nature of mandamus
to compel the Commissioner of Correction
of the State of New York to permit peti-
tioner the free exercise of his religion.
Special Term dismissed the petition with-
out a hearing, and the Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed.
Petitioner had alleged that he was a
member of the Islamic faith, and had been
denied spiritual advice, ministration and
religious services from the local temple in
contravention of Section 610 of the New
York Correction Law. That section pro-
vides:
See 6 CATHOLIC LAWYER 249 (Summer 1960).
'White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 651
(1871).
See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.
1944), cert denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
:1 Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d
791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
All persons who may have been or may
hereafter be committed to or taken charge
of by any of the institutions mentioned in
this section [penitentiaries and other cor-
rectional institutions], are hereby declared
to be and entitled to the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and wor-
ship, without discrimination or preference.
. . . The rules and regulations established
.. . shall recognize the right of the inmates
to the free exercise of their religious belief
. . . and shall allow religious services . . .
and for private ministrations to the inmates
in such manner as may best carry into
effect the spirit and intent of this section
and be consistent with the proper disci-
pline and management of the institu-
tion. .... 4
The answer filed by the respondent con-
sisted of a general denial, and, as an
affirmative defense, incorporated affidavits
of the Commissioner of Correction and the
Acting Warden of Green Haven Prison
denying the alleged deprivation of peti-
tioner's rights. The Commissioner's affi-
davit also indicated that the local temple
from which petitioner sought spiritual ad-
vice was headed by one Malcolm X. Little
who had a previous criminal record. The
Commissioner concluded:
[11n the interests of safety and security of
the institution concerned and a matter of
long standing policy, the allowing of in-
mates to communicate with or to be min-
istered to by a person with a criminal back-
4 N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 610 (emphasis added).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1962
ground would not be consistent with the
good administration of this institution. ,
The New York Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the proper discipline and man-
agement of a correctional institution au-
thorized the reasonable curtailment of an
inmate's rights:
[F]reedom of exercise of religious worship
is not an absolute but rather a preferred
right; it "cannot interfere with the laws
which the State enacts for its preservation,
safety or welfare .. " While freedom to
believe is absolute, freedom to act is not.
. .. "Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal
system."
6
However, the court indicated that peti-
tioner's brief stated that he did not seek
to communicate with any specific individ-
ual. Hence, the Commissioner's objection
to Malcolm X. Little was no bar to the
designation of any "recognized clergy-
man." Accordingly, the court reversed the
lower court's dismissal and remitted the
matter for a hearing to determine the re-
lief to vhich petitioner was entitled, sub-
ject to the reasonable rules and regulations
of the Commissioner for the proper man-
agement of the institution.
Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 534, 180
N.E.2d 791, 792, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (1962).
"Id. at 536, 180 N.E.2d at 793, 225 N.Y.S.2d at
500.'
